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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT M. MCRAE,

Court of Appeals:
#87-0431-CA

Applicant/ Appellant,
Industrial Commission:
#85000739
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
and SECOND INJURY FUND,

Administrative Law Judge;
Richard G. Sumsion
Priority: #6
APPEAL

Defendants/Respondents.

JURISDICTION
This

is

an

action

for

review

and

determination

of the

lawfulness of a denial of an award by the Industrial Commission of
Utah.

The Court

of Appeals

has jurisdiction

by virtue of Utah

Code Annotated Section 35-1-86.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a Petition for Review of the

Industrial Commission's

Order denying compensation benefits to Mr. Robert McRae.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily

and capriciously in denying worker's compensation
McRae

by

result of

deciding

Plaint iff/Appellant's

injury by

accident as

benefits to Mr.

heart attack was not a

defined in

U.C.A. 35-1-45, and

interpretive case law.
2.
and

Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily

capriciously

in

denying

Plaint iff/Appellant

worker's

compensation benefits when there was significant competent medical

evidence

that

his

heart

attack

was

unrelated

to

his

work

act ivities.
3.

Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily

and capriciously in not referring the matter to a medical panel.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Statutes, cases and authorities believed to

be determinative

of the respective issues include the following:
1.

Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

2.

Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

3.

Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

4-

Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)

5.

Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237
(Utah 1987)

The statutes

and cases

mentioned herein are attached hereto

in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves
compensation benefits

Mr.

Robert

McRae's

claim

for worker's

for an injury which he alleges he sustained

by an accident arising out of or in

the course

of his employment

on or about June 28, 1985.
B. Course of Proceedings and
Disposition by Industrial Commission
On January 16, 1987, a hearing was held on this matter before
the Industrial
Sumsion

entered

Commission.
Findings

On
of

June

22,

1987,

Judge Richard

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

denying Applicant's claim for compensation benefits.
2

(R.390)

On

August 10, 1987, Appellant filed a Motion For Review.

(R.399)

September

upheld

9,

1987,

Administrative Law

the

Industrial

Judge by

Commission

On
the

its Order denying Motion for Review.

(R.434)
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On June 28, 1985,

employed as

an attorney

the Appellant,

Mr. Robert

McRae was

with the law firm of McRae and Deland in

Vernal, Utah. (R.36-37)
2.

On June 28, 1985,

Mr.

McRae

experienced

pain

in his

stomach area and sought medical attention at Ashley Valley Medical
Center. (H.41)
3.

After seeking

medical attention,

Mr. McRae

went to an

oil field to see a client. (R.42)
4.

On June

29, 1985

at about

went to Ashley Valley Medical Center

9:00 a.m.,
to seek

Mr. McRae again

follow-up treatment

for the pain he was experiencing the day before. (R.43)
5.

On June

29, 1985, after an EKG and blood test at Ashley

Valley Medical Center, Mr. McRae returned to his office to

take a

routine deposition. (R.44, 218)
6.

At about 11:00 a.m. on June 29, 1985, Mr. McRae received

a telephone call from Dr. Norman Nielsen, who
he

should

"[g]et

to

the

informed McRae that

hospital,...[because he was] having a

heart attack." (R.47)
7.
Vernal,

On June 29, 1985, McRae was transported by airplane from
Utah

to

Salt

Lake

City,

Hospital. (R.48-49)
3

and

admitted

to St. Mark's

8.

On June 30, 1985, at St. Mark's Hospital, triple by-pass

heart surgery was performed on Mr- McRae.
9.

Since

1980,

Mr.

McRae

(R.275)

has been taking medication for

high blood pressure. (R.62)
10.

In 1970, Mr. McRae was admitted

to Holy

Cross Hospital

for chest pains. (R. 75, 377)
11.

In

September

of

1974,

Mr. McRae was admitted to the

University of Colorado Medical Center for chest pains.
12.

In March of

1982,

McRae

was

admitted

(R.77)

to

the Ashley

Valley Medical Center for treatment for a Valium overdose.
(R. 97, 309)
13.

Before

June

of

1985,

McRae

had a 30 year history of

smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. (R.78)
14.
had been

Prior to June of

1985, Mr.

for many

(R.217)

years.

McRae was

He had been using alcohol for

over 33 years, since he was 16 years old.
15.

In May of 1984,

McRae had

(R.80)

cancer surgery

his penis with loss of the distal portion.
16.

an alcoholic and

(R.94, 275)

McRae, prior to June of 1985 had experienced stress over

the subdivision of some real property which he owned.
17.

performed on

McRae, prior to June

of 1985

had a

(R.94, 275)

confrontation with

his wife concerning his marriage, when his wife found out about an
extramarital affair he had.

(R.94, 275)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Section
provides that

35-1-45,

Utah

an employee

Code
"who is
4

Annotated

(1953,

as amended)

injured...by accident arising

out of

or

in

the

compensation."

course

The Utah

of

to

be

employment,...shal1

be paid

case of Allen v. Industrial Commission,

729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) sets
accident

his

forth

compensable,

that

the

in

order

claimant

employment was both the legal cause and the

for

must

such an

show that the

medical cause

of the

injury.
Because the

claimant had a preexisting condition in the form

of a heart condition,
prove that

he put

to show

forth unusual

substantially increased the
life.

legal causation

Because claimant

the claimant must

or extraordinary exertion which

risk

he

already

faced

- McRae, did not put forth extraordinary

exertion which substantially increased the risk
legal

causation

is

in everyday

lacking

and

therefore

he already faced,
the

injury

is not

compensable.
Further, with regard to the medical
there

is

no

supporting a
between

competent
finding

any

work

of

and
a

causation issue, because

uncontradicted

medically

related

demonstrable

exertion

Administrative Law Judge did not act

medical

and

the

evidence

causal link
injury,

the

arbitrarily and capriciously

in concluding that medical causation was lacking.
Accordingly,

because

causation exists in this
the

Industrial

neither
case, the

Commission's

Order

upheld.

5

legal

causation

injury is
denying

nor medical

noncompensable and
benefits

should be

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE "ALLEN TEST,"
BECAUSE THE
APPLICANT HAD A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION WHICH CONTRIBUTED
TO HIS INJURY, AND HE DID NOT PUT FORTH UNUSUAL OR
EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION, APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT
THE LEGAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURY, AND THEREFORE THE
ACCIDENT IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
Section

35-1-45,

provides that
out

of

or

Utah

an employee
in

the

this

phrase,

the
the

Annotated

"who is

course

compensation..." While
define

Code

of

(1953,

as amended)

injured...by accident arising

his employment, ...shall be paid

Workers'
recent

Compensation

case

of

Act

Allen

does not

v. Industrial

Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) sets forth the procedure to be
utilized in

analyzing accident cases involving internal failures.

^ n Allen, the sole issue on

appeal was

had

back

suffered

pre-existing

whether the

claimant who

problems and was injured as the

result of exertion usual and typical for his job, was
accident

arising

addressing this
standards as

out
issue,

of

or

the

in

injured "by

the course of employment."

Utah

Supreme

Court

set

forth the

follows:

This statute creates two prerequisites for a finding of
a compensable injury. First, the injury must be "by
accident."
Second, the language "arising out of or in
the course of employment" requires that there be a
causal connection between the injury and the employment.
See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983).
*

*

*

The language "arising out of or in the course of his
employment" found in U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-45
(Supp. 1986), was apparently intended to ensure that
6

In

compensation is only awarded where there is a sufficient
causal connection between the disability and the working
conditions.
The
causation
requirement
makes it
necessary to
distinguish those injuries which (a)
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting
condition results in symptoms which appear during work
hours without any enhancement from the work place, and
(b) those injuries which occur because some condition or
exertion required by the employment increases the risk
of injury which the worker normally faces in his
everyday life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 44
A.2d 329, 337 (Me. 1982). Only the latter type of injury
is compensable under U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-45.
There is no fixed formula by which the causation issue
may be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the
facts of each case.
Professor Larson has suggested a two-part causation test
which is consistent with the purpose of our workers'
compensation laws and helpful in determining causation.
We therefore adopt that test.
Larson suggests that
compensable injuries can best be identified by first
considering the legal cause of the injury and then its
medical cause.
Larson, supra Section 38.83 (a), at 7273. "Under the legal test, the law must define what
kind of exertion satisfies the test of 'arising out of
the employment'...[then] the doctors must say whether
the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to
support compensation) in fact caused this [injury]."
Larson supra Section 38.83 (a), at -276 to -277.
1.
Legal Cause - Whether an injury arose out of or in
the course of employment is difficult to determine where
the employee brings to the work place a personal element
of risk such as preexisting condition.

To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with
a preexisting condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition. This additional element of risk in the work
place is usually supplied by an exertion greater than
that undertaken in normal, everyday life.
This extra
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury thereby
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a
personal risk rather than exertions at work. Larson,
supra, Section 38.83 (b), at 2-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in practice as
follows:
7

If there
is some personal causal contribution
in the form of a [preexisting
condition], the
employment contribution
must take the form of
an
exertion
greater
than
that
of
nonemployment life...
If there
is no personal causal contribution,
that is, if
there
is no prior
weakness or
disease,
any
exertion
connected
with
the
employment
and
causally
connected
with the
[injury]
as a matter
of medical
fact
is
adequate
to satisfy
the
legal
test
of
causation.
Id.
Thus, where
the claimant suffers from a
preexisting condition which contributes to the
injury,
an unusual or extraordinary exertion
is required to prove
legal causation.
Where
there is no preexisting condition, a usual or
ordinary exertion is sufficient.
729 P.2d at 18, 24-26
Accordingly, Allen stands for the proposition that both
and medical

legal

causation must be established before an injury in the

course of employment is compensable.

Moreover, to

causation

with a preexisting

requirement,

a

claimant

meet the legal
condition

must show that the employment contributed something substantial to
increase the

risk he already faced in everyday life.

unusual or extraordinary exertion is required

to help

the employment did in fact contribute substantially
It

is

Respondent-Workers *

contention that the legal
Allen has

not been

Further, an

Compensation

causation requirement

prove that

to the injury.

Fund
as set

of

Utah's
forth in

met, and therefore the injury which Mr. McRae

sustained was not an accident "arising out of or in

the course of

his employment, ,f and therefore, it is a non-compensable

8

accident.

More

specifically,

inasmuch

workplace with a pre-existing
legal causation

can be

the

activities

employment

substantial to

as

Mr.

condition

McRae

(heart

came

injury,

established, there must be a finding that
of

increase the

it

is

the

disease), before

Mr.

McRae

risk he

contributed something

already faced.

That is, in

order to prove that Mr. McRae's employment was the legal
his

to

necessary

that

activities involved an unusual

he show that his employment

or extraordinary

than that of nonemployment life.

cause of

exertion greater

This, appellant has failed to so

prove•
At page 32 of Appellant's brief it is conceded that Mr. McRae
had a

preexisting heart condition.

("Since we have admitted that

McRae had a preexisting heart condition,
Because of

the existence

compensable,

prove

that

or

which

substantially

everyday life.
Appellant

unusual

it

1985,

and

is

incumbent

that he

extraordinary exertion was put forth

increased

the

risk

he

already

faced

in

(Emphasis added)
claims

that

certain stressful conditions existed

immediately prior to incurring his injury
29,

tests apply.")

of the preexisting heart condition, for

Mr. McRae's injury to be
an

two more

that

on June

28 and/or June

the stressful conditions were tantamount to

unusual or extraordinary exertion

so as

to support

a finding of

legal causation and therefore compensability*
Specifically, Appellant
on Saturday [June 29,
not only

because it

claims that

1985] was
was a

"A stressful deposition

unusually stressful

crucial deposition,
9

and unique,

but also because

McRae did not ordinarily work on Saturday. ...Claimants
was

so

heavy

during

the

last

week

work load

that he had to schedule a

stressful deposition on Saturday." (R.33-34)
Respondents take exception
that the

to

this

and maintain

deposition referred to was not as stressful as Appellant

might lead the Court to believe.

A

closer

record supports Respondents position.
Saturday referred to was
defendant."

(R.45)

"a clear

McRae

examination

of the

The deposition taken on the

liability case,

with a target

Further, Dr. McCann's records indicate, "The

patient described the taking
Moreover,

statement

did

not

of
spend

routine
an

depositions."

inordinate

preparing for the deposition on the 29th of June.

(R.218)

amount

of time

"I met with the

client at 9:30 to tell him - spent a half an hour with him ... and
explained to him what
question, and

a

the usual

deposition

is

things that

and

how

to

respond to

- I guess all of us in this

room would understand..." (R.46)
Appellant further maintains that

the stress

McRae was under

was tantamount to unusual exertion because "he was also working on
a

very

important

(Appellants Brief,

divorce
page 13)

reading something into the

case

with

Here,

high

financial

stakes."

appellant, citing R.45-46 is

record which

clearly does

not exist.

What the record accurately reflects is as follows:
Q.

How about
office?

assignments

A.

[McRae] When it's —
When it's going-to-court times on
routine D.U.I.'s and divorces and those types
of thing -- which divorces I don't take --

Q.

Uh-huh.
10

that

are made in the

A.

-- personally — then it's whoever's — I'm
the last of the colleagues of my cases, to put
it bluntly(H.46)

The foregoing
has blatantly

excerpt from

misstated the

the record

record.

McRae even handled a divorce case
preceding

his

injury,

let

shows that Appellant

There is no indication that

during

the

week

-

or month-

alone "a very important divorce case

with high financial stakes."
Accordingly,
Appellant's

work

it

is

at

best,

activities

very

during

preceding his injury arose to a

the

questionable

whether

time frame immediately

level which

may be characterized

as unusual or extraordinary in terms of the amount of exertion put
forth.
Respondent firmly
clearly indicate

maintains

the

facts

in

this case

that any mental stress which McRae was under did

not amount to unusual exertion.
by McRae

that

Moreover, any

stress experienced

because of his job-related activities, certainly did not

rise to the level

of being

a substantial

factor in

causing his

injury.
It

is

Respondent's

position

that Mr. McRae's schedule and

activities as an attorney were no more mentally stressful than the
average person's

non-employment mental

stresses of, for example,

social confrontations, financial problems, general health concerns
and/or the stresses of raising children.
While it

may be

somewhat difficult to objectively weigh one

11

mental stress against another, resorting back

to the

language of

Allen is helpful in resolving the dilemma.
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with
a preexisting condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition.
This additional element of risk in the
workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This
extra exertion serves
to
offset
the preexisting
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the
injury, thereby eliminating claims
for impairments
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at
work.
729 P.2d at 25
The key language here is "contributed
to

the

risk

already

faced.

If

the

something substantial"
work

activities do not

contribute something substantial, then legal causation
and the
did

injury is

McRae's

increasing the

work

not compensable.
related

Thus, the question becomes,
contribute

substantially

to

risk of heart failure that he already faced due to

his preexisting condition.
the legal

stress

is wanting

Inasmuch as in internal failure cases,

causation issue is closely intertwined with the medical

causation issue, this question may be answered by referring to the
various doctors' reports which are in the record.
Dr.
reviewing

J.
his

Joseph
prior

Perry,

M.D.,

medical

after examining Mr. McRae and

records,

responded

to

certain

questions put forth to him as follows:
1.

Is it probable that the stress of Mr. McRae's job caused
or contributed to his myocardial infarction, June 28,
1985?

[Dr. Perry's Response]
There was no change in his job
requirements, the physical activity, number of hours
worked, or
stresses in
the months prior to his
12

myocardial infarction, compared to the years before this
occurred. Therefore, there is no causal relationship of
an acute nature with his myocardial
infarction.
The
question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I
think that there was a much greater contribution to his
premature
coronary
atherosclerosis from his heavy
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his
facial xanthoma, as well as his type - A personality
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney.
(R.226)
Dr. David L. McCann, M.D. evaluated Mr. McRae's condition and
set forth as follows:
2.

Based on your examination and evaluation, would Mr.
McRae's personality type be more susceptible to stress
related diseases?

[Dr. McCann's Response] Alcoholics are more susceptible
to a wide variety of diseases including heart
disease.
3.

Could his personality type, given the nature
of his work, have contributed to his heart
attack on June 28, 1985?

[Dr. McCann's Response] The patient's alcoholism could
have contributed to his heart attack by way
of alteration of blood lipids and increased
risk of arteriosclerosis.
7.

If possible, could you
give your expert
opinion as to whether or not Mr. McRae was
under any excessive or abnormal stress prior
to the time of his myocardial infarction?

[Dr. McCann's Response] The patient described the taking
of routine depositions. The primary stress he
appeared to be under was from making bad
financial decisions
and
having
to work
excessively to compensate for them. (R.218)
In light

of Dr.

Perry's report, it is readily apparent that

there are a number of risk factors - other than job related stress
- which were
infarction.
five

major

very substantial
From a purely
risk

in causing

logical

factors

standpoint,

present
13

Mr. McRae's myocardial

(cigarette

where

there are

smoking,

high

cholesterolemia,

facial

xanthoma,

alcoholism), even

in the

absence of
one

adding

contribution to

the risk he already faced.
was not

-

the work

would seem that

the work related stress

more

type

factor

is

A

personality,

stress factor, it
not

a substantial

Consequently, because

a substantial

factor in causing

the infarction, pursuant to Allen, the injury is not compensable.
In

addition

to

the

risk

factors enumerated by Dr. Perry,

Respondent is of the belief that there existed
non

work-related

stresses

which

may

very

a number
well

responsible for bringing about injury to Mr. McRae.
as

early

as

1980

pressure and was
addition

thereto,

Mr.

taking
the

have

been

Specifically,

McRae was diagnosed as having high blood
medication
record

for

from St.

the

same.

(R.62)

In

indicates that Mr. McRae may have

been experiencing great stress in other
Discharge Summary

of other

aspects of

his life.

A

Mark's Hospital, dated July 16, 1985,

sets forth the following:
He has been under some stress lately.
In May of 1984,
he had cancer surgery on his penis with loss of the
distal portion of the penis...But there is stress in a
real state of division he has been working on.1 There
is a partner defaulting on the situation there and his
wife had recently found out about a recent affair and
there is some conflict in their marriage over that. His
wife reports that he has always talked about suicide.
Four years
ago
he
had
a
Valium
and alcohol
overdose...(R.275)
It

is

Respondent's

position

that

circumstances - separate and apart from any work

1

these

additional

related stresses

The record, at R. 94 and 95 indicates that this involved
stress over an investment in real estate; Specifically, the
subdivision of a farm owned by McRae.
14

- very probably
workplace.

were more

stressful than the stresses of McRae's

That is to say,

McRae faced

the stresses

life which

(financial stress, health stress, social stress) were

greater than the stresses of being
additional stresses
everyday

of everyday

life

Moreover, these

which McRae encountered are stresses faced in

in

exertion/stress

an attorney.

the

20th

associated

Century.
with

extraordinary or unusual, and

as

the

such,

Accordingly,
workplace

cannot

be

was

the
not

considered a

legal cause of McRae's injury.
Thus,

McRae's

employment

substant ial to increase the
life.

Rather, the

during work hours
Wherefore, because

did

risk

he

not

contribute

already

faced

anything

in everyday

myocardial infarction coincidentally occurred
without

any

enhancement

McRae's injury

was not

from

the workplace.

legally caused by his

employment, the "accident" herein did not "arise out of or

in the

course of employment," and is therefore not compensable.
At this

juncture, Respondent

some of the cases cited by
Rossendahl

Construction

sees it fitting to distinguish

Appellant.
and

Mining

1977) as standing for the proposition
EXERTION

IS

REQUIRED."

After

Appellant cites
Corp.,

565 P.2d 1144 (Utah

that "ONLY

discussing

Nuzum v.

SLIGHT PHYSICAL

the facts of Nuzum,

appellant states, and adds emphasis "Merely climbing in and out of
the

cab

Tof

the

recover benefits."

truck]

was found to be sufficient exertion to

(Appellant's Brief at page 18)

Appellants reliance on Nuzum is misplaced.
Allen case

reinterpreted the

standards that
15

First,

the later

had been applied by

the Nuzum Court, thereby creating a significantly different burden
on an

applicant with

a preexisting condition.

Further, while it

is true that the Court held that the employees death resulted from
an accidental

occurrence that

arose out

of and in the course of

employment, by the facts the Nuzum case was
Allen.

The Applicant

climbing in and

out

hoisting himself

in Nuzum
of

the

up these

sustained injury

cab,"

but

that

this

of line with
not by "merely

rather,

by "repeatedly

abnormally long steps into the cab and

was thus put to a greater exertion than
required. ..and

not out

placed

normally would

such

stress

on

his

weakened heart that it could not cope with the burden."
1146.

That is,

Nuzum was

preexisting heart
putting forth

condition

concerned with
and

because

have been
already
Nuzum at

an employee who had a
he

was

injured while

an unusual exertion, his injury arose "out of or in

the course of employment."
Appellant also relies heavily

upon the

1949 case

of Purity

Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961 (Utah 1949)
as standing for
REQUIRED"

the

(Appellants

proposition
Brief

at

Appellant's needs to be clarified.
as

follows:

"Only

usual

that

"ONLY

page

18).

A proper

exertion

exertion is the cause of the injury.11

USUAL

EXERTION IS

This statement of
statement would read

is required so long as the
In Purity

Biscuit Co., the

Utah Supreme Court set forth:
We again wish to make it clear that we do not intend to
dispense with that requirement that in a case of this
kind where the employee suffers an internal bodily
failure or breakdown the burden is on the applicant to
show that the exertion was at least a contributing cause
thereof. In other words, we are not abandoning the
16

requirement that in cases where disease or internal
failure causes or is the injury there must be a causal
connection between the employment and the injury.
201 P.2d at 961
Again, the Purity case cited by Appellant is not inconsistent
with Allenlaw which

Rather, Allen acted to clarify

the inconsistent case

handed down since Purity. 2

had been

Accordingly, when

an internal failure is the injury, as in the case at bar, a causal
connection between
if an applicant

the employment

is

to

be

and injury must be established

compensated.

Allen

set

forth the

standards to be utilized in determining the causation issue.
POINT II
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT THE STRESS OR EXERTION REQUIRED BY MR. MCRAE'S JOB
WAS THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURY, AND THEREFORE,
PURSUANT TO THE "ALLEN TEST" THE ACCIDENT IS NOT
COMPENSABLE.
As with

the issue

appropriate place
causation.

to

concerning legal
commence

a

causation, Allen is the

discussion

concerning medical

The Utah Supreme Court set forth the following:

[10] 2.
Medical Cause - The second part of Larson's
dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the
disability is medically the result of an exertion or
2

"When read
in chronological
sequence, our opinions
demonstrate an inconsistent and confused approach to determining
when an accident
arose
out
of
or
in
the
course of
employment.... [W]e take this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet the objectives of the
workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question
in determining causation is whether, given this body and this
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. Id.
Section 38.82 at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d
at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
Allen, 729 P.2d at 24
17

injury that occurred during a work-related* activity.
The purpose of the medical cause test is to ensure that
there is a medically demonstrable causal link between
the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries
that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal
requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a
general
insurer
of
his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.
*

*

*

Under the medical cause test, the claimant must show by
evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain,
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the
resulting injury or disability.
In the event the
claimant cannot show a
medical causal connection,
compensation should be denied.
729 P.2d at 27
Thus, in
be

accordance with

compensable,

it

medically caused

must

by the

be

Allen, in order for an accident to
determined

stress, strain,

that

the

injury

was

or exertion required by

one's employment.
In the proceedings below,

the Industrial

Commission did not

reach the issue of medical causation because it conclusively found
that legal
medical

causation

causation

issues of legal
closely

was

was

wanting

rendered

causation

intertwined

in

and

and
moot.

medical

internal

therefore

Respondent will

issue of

However, inasmuch as the
causation

appear

to be

failure cases, and inasmuch as

Appellant herein briefly makes mention of the medical
this case,

the

briefly address

findings of

the issue of medical

causation.
The medical causation standard espoused in Allen was followed
and discussed

in the

context of a heart attack case in Lancaster

v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987).
18

some connection
Thus,
al thou gh there may have been
and the cold weather and high
betwe en t he heart attack
the evidence
of any
altit ude [the industrial factors],
Not one of the doctors
such conn ect ion is inconclusive.
certainty
that the
was w illi ng t o state with medical
njury
was
caused
by
work-related
factors.
claim ant' s i
is competent
and comprehensive
medical
Thus,
th ere
evide nee in t he record upon which the Administrative Law
that medical causation
Judge cou Id r ely in concluding
Although
the medical
evidence was
lack ing.
was
it
is
the
responsibility
of
the
conf 1 ict ing,
Admin is trat iv e Law Judge to resolve factual conflicts.
736 P.2d 240-241
As in

Lancaster, in

and uncontradicted
that

there

existed

the case at hand there is not competent

testimony
a

indicating

medical

causal

industrial events and Mr. McRae's

with

medical

certainty

link between the alleged

infarction.

Appellant relies upon a letter written by Dr.

F. Clyde Null,

which sets forth:
Athe roscler otic hear t disease , of course, is exacerbated
unde r sympt oms of an gina pec torus
or made much worse
unde r perio ds of em otional s tress , pressure or tension.
Prol onged h ours of a ct ivity, s t riking degree of physical
exer tion,
to
c old,
or marked
emotional
exposure
frequ ent ly result
pres sure a nd
tensi on
in
increase
symp toms r eferable
to the hea rt.
Mr. McRae has
unde rlying atheroscl erotic he art d isease, and of course,
all of the symptoms
of that diso rder can be made worse
by h eavy wo rk loads and exces sive emotional pressure and
tens ion.
*

*

*

In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related
to his occupation
are certainly
associated
with an
aggravation
to
produce his myocardial
infarction.
(Appellant's Brief at page 20 and 21; R.228)
On the other hand, as set

forth earlier

in this

brief, Dr.

Perry made the following statement concerning Mr. McRae:
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue.
I think that there was a much greater
contribution to
19

his premature coronary artherosclerosis from his heavy
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his
facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard driving
personality than one could attribute to his job as an
attorney.
(R.226)
As can be seen from the statements of the respective doctors,
the two views are not completely
Lancaster,

the

evidence

of

compatible.

any connection between work related

stress and the injury is inconclusive.
Perry's

statement,

record upon which
concluding that

there
the

is

Accordingly, as in

Thus,

competent

Administrative

Law

did

-

light

of Dr.

medical evidence in the
Judge

medical causation was lacking.

what the Administrative Law Judge

in

rely

could

rely in

That is precisely
upon

Dr. Perry's

opinions.
But, as applied to the facts of the instant case, the
Administrative Law Judge finds the analysis and opinion
of Dr. Perry more accurately reflects the causative
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and
bypass surgery and the Administrative Law Judge adopts
Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so, it should
be noted
that in analyzing the causative factors
leading to heart problems,
the risk
factors are
generally well known.
Isolating which of those risk
factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an
almost impossible task, but a consideration of the
factors does allow for a considered opinion relative to
the medical probabilities. The significance of this is
emphasized by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the
case of Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, filed April
20, 1987. (R.394)
Thus, in

accordance

with

Lancaster,

although

the medical

evidence was conflicting, it is the responsibility and prerogative
of the Administrative Law Judge to resolve factual

conflicts, and

therefore no error was committed in adopting Dr. Perry's opinion.
Further, Respondent

feels compelled to address certain other

statements made by Appellant with regard to the
20

medical causation

issue.

Appellant

argues

that

because

Dr. Perry was not the

treating physician, "[C]ertainly such a report should not be given
equal standing

with the

report of the treating physician, but if

it is given any credence, it should be
the questions

of aggravation

a basis

and causation

for submission of

to a medical panel."

(Appellant's Brief on page 22)
This statement by Appellant is in complete opposition
rule

of

law

as

set

forth

in

Lancaster.

to the

That is, appellant

maintains that in any case involving conflicting medical opinions,
the

treating

physician's

opinion

should be given more credence

than that of any other physician who has reviewed the
set

forth

a

calculated

otherwise.

The

appropriate

to

opinion.

Commission
competent

is

Lancaster

to

give

admissible

records and

clearly

what

weight

evidence

states
it deems

according to the

circumstances of the case.
POINT III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT REFERRING THE MATTER TO A MEDICAL
PANEL; NOR DID HE ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN
FINDING THAT MCRAE'S INJURY IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
Appellant maintains

that the

arbitrarily and capriciously by
medical

panel.

Section

amended) sets forth that
aspects

of

the

case

not

the
to

commission
a

medical

The language of this

this

discretionary

a

referring

the

matter

to a

35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as

commission.
is

Administrative Law Judge acted

panel

and

the medical

appointed

by

the

indicates that

therefore referral to a

Moreover, in
21

refer

statute clearly

function

medical panel is not mandatory.

may

light of Lancaster,

because there

was competent

Administrative
medical

Law

Judge

evidence

that

medical evidence
acted

best

properly
addressed

in the record, the

in
the

relying
question

upon the
of

substantial the work contribution was in causing the injury.
is, while

That

the aforementioned statements of Dr. Perry and Dr. Null

addressed the same issues generally, Dr.
to

how

quantifying

comparison to

how
the

substantial
preexisting

the

Perry's statement looked
work

factors.

stress factor was in
Dr.

Null's

did not.

Further, Dr. Null's opinion - while not completely compatible with
the opinion of Dr. Perry - is not completely at odds with
Dr. Perry.
analysis.

Dr.

Perry merely elaborated more definitively in his

As such, it was not mandatory

appointed to

that of

that a

medical panel be

resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy

was evident.
POINT IV
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S
DECISION
DENYING
COMPENSATION
TO
MR.
MCRAE WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY
WITHOUT CAUSE,
OR WITHOUT ANY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND THEREFORE THE
ORDER OF THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
MAY
NOT BE
OVERTURNED.
The standard

of review

which has been utilized by the Court

in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous
cases which

have articulated

the power

or scope of review which

the reviewing court possesses with regard to decisions handed down
by the Industrial Commission.
One such case which clearly sets forth the proper standard is

22

Kaiser Steel Corporation v.

Monfredi, 631

P.2d 888

(Utah 1981).

In Kaiser the Court stated:
Under any of these standards . . . it is apparent that
this Court's function in reviewing Commission findings
of fact is a strictly limited one in which the question
is not whether the Court agrees with the Commission's
findings
or
whether
they
are supported by the
preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing
court's inquiry is whether the Commission's findings
are "arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without cause"
or contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the
evidence" to support them.
Only then should the
Commissions findings be displaced. 631 P.2d at 890.
Another case

which addressed the issue of this Court's scope

of review is Martinson

v. W.M.

Insurance Agency,

Inc., 606 P.2d

256 (Utah 1980):
When the Commission remains unpersuaded on a question of
fact, this Court does not disagree therewith and compel
such a finding unless the evidence is such that all
reasonable minds would so find, and the court would thus
so rule as a matter of law. On the contrary, if there
is a reasonable basis in the evidence (or lack of
evidence) such that reasonable minds acting fairly
thereon could remain unpersuaded, this Court does not
upset the determination made.
606 P.2d at 258, 259.
See also the very recent case of Hodges v. Western Piling and
Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718, 720 (Utah 1986) wherein this Court
stated, "In

reviewing questions

of fact,

deference to the Commission's findings.

this Court gives great

Only where

the findings

are without foundation in the evidence will the court reverse."
Accordingly, applying
at

bar,

Industrial
upon the

the

the above-cited

Appellate

Court

is

Commission's

order

unless

entire record,

powerless

the Industrial
23

authority to the case
to

overturn

the

it can be said that based
Commission clearly acted

arbitrarily and

capriciously in

holding that

the injury was not

compensable•
An

examination

Commission did
that

Mr.

of

the

record

makes

it

clear

that

the

not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining

McRae's

work

related

stress

caused

his

injury.

Therefore, the order must stand.
CONCLUSION
The

Industrial

Commission-based

on

credible,

competent

evidence-decided as a matter of fact that McRae's heart attack was
not the

result of his work activities.

compensable industrial accident.
Industrial

Commission

Thus, he did not suffer a

In reaching

applied

its conclusion, the

the appropriate legal standard as

set forth in Allen.
Therefore,

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

should

Industrial Commission's ruling denying compensation.
DATED this

fo^day

of April, 1988.

James /R. Black

Kfvip M. McDonough
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ADDENDUM 1
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35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in
the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
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ADDENDUM 2

28

35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
Upon the filing of a claim for compel*potion for injury by accident, or for
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having
the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays
and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the commission, as it may determine and thereafter make a report in
writing to, the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and«alsomake such additional findings as the commission may require. The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel to the
applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail with
return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in
the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the insurance
carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted in
evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the
commission. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, .and at such hearing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of
the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of the
panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in
the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical panel and of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided for by section
35-1-63.

29

ADDENDUM 3

30

35-1-86. Court of Appeals may review commission's actions [Effective January 1, 1988].
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any
award of the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of
any award.
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ADDENDUM 4
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No. 85000739

ROBERT M. MCRAE,
Applicant,
vs.
MCRAE & DELAND a n d / o r
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

Defendants«

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

^7
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER _ .-

"\

, ^ e fund
Sta*

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 16,
1987, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sums ion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Keith E.
Sohm, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Elliot K. Morris,
Attorney at Law.

The issues in this case are as follows:
1.

Was the stress of the applicant's employment as an
attorney on June 28-29, 1985, the cause of the heart
attack sustained at that time?

2.

Does the stress to which the applicant was subjected
on or before June 28, 1985, fulfill the r acquirements
of legal causation and medical causation as defined in
the recent case of Allen v. Industrial Commission?

3.

If so, what benefits is the applicant entitled to
under the Workers Compensation Act?

33

ROBERT MCRAE
FINDINGS AND ORDER
PAGE TWO

FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The applicant is a practicing trial attorney with offices in
Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. On June 28-29, 1985, the applicant
sustained a severe heart attack during the course of his employment. The
diary or schedule kept by his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit Court, and
a meeting with a client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after lunch, he
had severe stomach pains prompting him to go to the Ashley Valley Medical
Center. He had blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a serum test
would be made. To his knowledge, he went to the oil field to meet with his
client. Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good. He had dinner
downtown, because his wife was in Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to
him the reason for the blood serum test. Apparently they suspected an ulcer
condition. He decided not to stay in the hospital, even though he had been
asked to do so. The following morning, June 29, 1985, he returned to the
Ashley Valley Medical Center for a repeat blood test and another EKG. He then
went to his office, because he was so*eduled to be involved in depositions.
2. The applicant proceeded with the depositions the morning of June
29, 1985, but around 11:00 a.m., Dr. Norman Nielsen called from the hospital
and informed the applicant he was having a heart attack and he was to get to
the hospital immediately. He finished the deposition in which he was involved
and then sent his secretary home to get some clothes. He then drove three
blocks to the hospital. He was then sent by lifeline to Salt Lake City, where
he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital. He recalls very little* that
happened after that for a period of some fourteen days. He underwent a triple
bypass surgery on July 1, 1985. He was told that he came very close to dying
on a couple of occasions. He was released from the hospital on July 16,
1985. He returned to active practice around August 12, 1985, but on a limited
basis, avoiding court appearances, and has continued to do so to the present
time.
3.
The applicant has a long documented history of prior heart
disease, dating back fifteen years or so prior to the incident in questi:n.
The risk factors contributing to his coronary atheroscerosis include heavy
cigarette smoking, high cholesterolemia, facial xanthoma, heavy drinker of
alcoholic beverages, type "A" personality, high blood pressure, and employment
as a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial
work for more than twenty-five years.
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4.
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated with the
applicant's particular practice of law. It is probably safe to assume that it
was a more stressful practice than engaged in by most attorneys, but there is
no indication that it was uniquely stressful.
Chronic job stress is
considered by cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to coronary
atheroscerosis. As with many of the stress factors, they usually do not have
an acute impact upon the development of the disease, but the long-term impact
appears to be borne out in numerous case histories.
5. The nurses* notes at the Ashley Valley Medical Center, recorded
on June 28, 1985, are significant. They indicate he was
•'admitted with complaints of chest pain since Sunday.
He states that the pain comes and goes and also has
complaints of pain to both arms.**
See Exhibit "D-l", p. 83. There is some dispute as to whether or not he
really complained of chest pains, or simply informed the nurse by pointing to
his chest and across his shoulders, and this was construed as a description of
chest pain.
6. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges the use of such terms
as "heart attack" and "myocardial infarction" in this Order and in various
medical records is accurate only in the broadest sense of those terms. More
accurately, his condition is described as atherosclerotic heart disease and
pending myocardial infarction with findings consistent with severe coronary
insufficiency. Angiography performed on June 30th showed high grade stenosis
of the three arteries in which bypass surgery was performed. The applicant
had severe respiratory difficulties after surgery in addition to other
problems and he was in the intensive care unit much longer than is normally
the case.
7.
In dealing with the causation factors associated with the
applicant's heart attack, it is important to understand the conflict of
opinion that exists. Applicant's cardiologist, Dr. F. Clyde Null, offered the
following explanation in response to an inquiry from applicant's attorney:
"Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or made much worse
under periods of emotional stress, pressure and tension.
Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure
and tension frequently result in increased symptoms referable to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of
that disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and
excessive emotional pressure and tension."

35

ROBERT MCRAE
FINDINGS AND ORDER
PAGE FOUR

8
Dr. J. Joseph Perry, who is also a specialist in cardiology,
offered the following explanation in response to an inquiry from the insurance
adjuster:
M

There was no change in his job requirements, the
physical activity, number or hours worked, or stresses in
the months prior to his myocardial infarction, compared to
the years before this occurred.
Therefore, there is no
causal relationship of an acute nature with his myocardial
infarction.
The question of chronic job stress is a
different issue. I think that there was a much greater
contribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from
his heavy cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and
his facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving
personality than one could attribute to his job as an
attorney."
9.
After considering the foregoing possible scenarios and the
importance of the role of stress, the Administrative Law Judge fin^s no
convincing evidence of any unusual or acute stress with "regard to the
applicant's work activities on the date of, or preceding» the onset of *he
symptoms which led to his hospitalization and eventual bypass surgery. This
is not to say that he was not working under stressful circumstances. To the
contrary, as noted previously, the applicant's type and style of practice
could justifiably be characterized as more stressful than most attorneys. It
does not appear, however, as pointed out by Dr. Perry, that during the last
week of June, 1985 there was any significant change in his job requirements,
the level of his physical activity, the number or hours worked, or the
stresses he had experienced in the months prior thereto.
It is also
significant to note that the history taken at the St. Mark's Hospital on June
29, 1985, on the date of his admission is as follows:
"This gentleman on 5-23-85 [6-23-85] noted the onset
of substernal epigastric pain following a day of rather
significant physical exertion that persisted for a short
period of time then remissed with no medication. On the
day following, as he awoke, he again noted the same
substernal pain persisting longer and more intense and
[than] at this time of the day previously.
His wife
checked his pulse and was aware that it was irregular. On
the day following the chest pain occurred and reoccurred
intermittently
with
recurring
episodes
of discomfort
substernal and attended by some element of shortness of
breath.
By Friday, the chest pain was intermittent,
severe, radiating to his neck and to his arms and to his
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wrists. This was occurring bilaterally, but more severe on
the left arm. He was seen in the emergency room at the
Ashley Valley Hospital.
An EKG was obtained that is
reported to have shown some T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and
AVF. Enczymes were said to be normal. However, because of
the chest pain persisting and because of the concern of the
doctors, he was called on Saturday, 6-29-85 for a revisit
to the emergency room, at which time the EKG changes were
more pronounced with definite T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and
AVF, but also an elevated CPK of 417 and a isoenczyme of 66
constituting a 15% range. Because of the EKG changes and
the enczyme changes, he was air-evacuated to St. Mark's
Hospital
for
evaluation
and
admission
for
further
diagnostic studies.** (See Exhibit **D-1*', p. 64).
For the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant
has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing the requirements of legal
causation or medical causation as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, "[29 P.2d 25 (1986).
Footnote 9
referred to in the Allen decision is of particular significance when applied
to the facts of this case. It reads:
"Evidence of the ordinariness or unusualness of the
employee's exertions may be relevant to the medical
conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results
from latent symptoms with an illness such as heart disease,
proof of medical causation may be especially difficult.
Larsen's treatise cites many examples of cases where
compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate
proof of medical causation.
See Larson, supra, Para.
38.83(i) at 7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline, Indus.
Pointers, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) heart attack
triggered by stress, exertion, and strain greater than
sedentary life of average worker compensable.
Admittedly, there is case authority on both sides of the issue. But, as
applied to the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds
the analysis and opinion of Dr. Perry more jicurately reflects the causative
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and bypass surgery, and the
Administrative Law Judge adopts Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so,
it should be noted that in analyzing the causative factors leading to heart
problems, the risk factors are generally well know. Isolating which of those
risk factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an almost impossible
task, but a consideration of the factors does allow for a considered opinion
relative to the medical probabilities. The significance of this is emphasized
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Lancaster v. Gilbert
Development, filed April 20, 1987.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Only a portion of the relevant evidence is reflected in the foregoing
Findings of Fact, but such is deemed sufficient to identify the issues and the
basis for the determination that the applicant has failed to meet his burden
of proof in establishing legal and medical causation. Accordingly, the claim
of the applicant must necessarily be denied.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the
same is hereby, denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Mouion for review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion17
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
tr £g7?4s~day of June, 1987.
ATTEST:

Commission
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

ROBERT M. MCRAE,

85000739

*
*

Applicant,
*

vs.
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

*

ORDER DENYING

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

I
Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

RECEIVED
SEP 101387

* *

Workers Compensation Fund
Legal Department

On June 22, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits related to
a June 29, 1985 incident in the course of employment and subsequent triple
by-pass heart surgery performed on July 1, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge
denied all benefits because the Administrative Law Judge found that neither
legal nor medical cassation were established*
The Administrative Law Judge
cited the case Allen vs the Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) as
authority for the proposition that both legal and medical cause must be
established before an injury in the course of employment is compensable. The
Administrative
Law
Judge
found
that
the
applicant's
pre-existing
arteriosclerotic heart condition required the applicant show that unusual
exertion in the course of employment caused the need for the by-pass surgery
in order to establish legal causation. The Administrative Law Judge found the
events leading up to the hospitilization and surgery did not constitute
unusual exertion.
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found legal
causation was not established.
Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge
found that the medical evidence taken as a whole, did not confirm that work
related stress caused the need for surgery, and thus the Administrative Law
Judge found no medical causation.
As neither of the two elements of
compensability
were
established
(legal
and
medical
causation),
the
Administrative Law Judge found the June 29, 1985 incident was not
compensable.
On August 10, 19?', pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the
applicant filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for the applicant argues that
aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable according to both
statutory and case law. He states that any question regarding whether an
aggravation occurred should be submitted to a medical panel for resolution and
should not be decided by the Administrative Law Judge. Counsel for the
applicant cites numerous pre-Allen Supreme Court cases as authority for the
proposition that only usual exertion is required for a finding of
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compensability, Zn the other hand, counsel for the applicant maintains t*~at
the applicant was exposed to unusual exertion leading up to the by-pass
surgery in the form of work related stress. Counsel for the applicant cites
pre-Allen cases involving facts similar to the facts of the instant case as
authority for the conclusion that stress can be exertion. Counsel for the
applicant concludes that the work related stress the applicant experienced was
unusual exertion which aggravated his pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart
disease causing the need for by-pass surgery.
Therefore, counsel for the
applicant finds the June 29, 1985 work stress resulting in coronary
insufficiency is compensable.
On August 17, 1987, counsel for the defendant/Workers Compensation
Fund filed a Response to the applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for the
defendant states U.C.A. 35-1-77's permissive language gives the Administrative
Law Judge the discretion whether to refer a medical question to a medical
panel for resolution. Counsel for the defendant states it is therefore not
improper for the Administrative Law Judge to determine no medical panel
referral is necessary and to decide the case based on medical evidence
submitted at the hearing. Because there was medical evidence submitted that
supports the .Administrative Law Judge's finding that the events leading up to
the surgery were not t\±c legal or medical cause for the need fcr surgery,
counsel ror the defendant maintains it was proper for the Administrative Law
Judge to rely on that evidence in denying benefits.
The Commission finds that the issues to be resolved on review are
whether legal and medical cause are established by the facts in the instant
case. This case presents the unique question regarding what amount of mental
stress will objectively be considered unusual exertion so as to establish
legal causation. This case also presents the difficult question of how to
decide medical causation where even the medical experts decline to pinpoint a
definitive cause for the internal failure. Many of the points made by counsel
for the applicant in the Motion for Review are not contested. The Commission
agrees pre-existing conditions aggravated by a work injury can be compensated
and the Commission agrees mental stress can be considered exertion. The
issues involved here are whether the facts in this case show the mental stress
amounted to unusual exertion and whether the mental zcress medically caused an
aggravation of the arteriosclerotic cornoary
condition. Because the Allen
case significantly changed the elements of compensability with respect to
industrial injuries, just reviewing pre-Allen cases with similar facts is
insufficient for purposes of determining compensability in this case. The
Allen unusual exertion legal causation standard and the element of medical
causation are the key issues here.
In applying the unusual exertion legal causation standard, applicable
to this case due to the pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease, the
Commission must admit it is very difficult to determine what constitutes
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unusually- exertive mental stress as compared to what the avevnge person
encounters on a daily basis in non-employment life. The question becomes was
the applicant's busy schedule as a trial attorney more mentally stressful than
the average person's non-employment mental stresses of for example social
confrontations, financial problems and/or the stress of raising children.
This is a particularly perplexing problem and the Commission finds it
difficult to weigh one mental stress against another objectively. To resolve
the dilemma, the Commission must resort back to the language in Allen.

_
^

To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a
pre-existing condition must show that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his condition.
This additional element of risk in the work place is
usually supplied
by an exertion greater than that
undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims
for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.

The Commission finds the key language here is "contributed something
substantial" to the risk already faced. If the work place does contribute
something substantial, then legal cause is established.
So the question
becomes, did the applicant's work place stress contribute something
substantial that increased the risk of heart failure that the applicant
already faced due to his pre-existing condition.
The question must be answered by viewing the medical evidence. Both
doctors who review the question of contribution of work stress find work
stress as one of a number of contributing factors to the risk of heart failure
the applicant faced.
The Administrative Law Judge chose to rely on Dr.
Perry's statement as follows:
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I
think that there was a much greater contribution to his
premature
coronary
artherosclerosis
from
his
heavy
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his facial
xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard-driving personality
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney.
Counsel for the applicant cites Dr. Null's statement as follows:
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to
his occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation
to produce his mild myocardial infarction.
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Dr. Perryfs statement looks to quantifying how substantial the work stress
factor was in comparison to the pre-existing factors. Dr. Null's does not.
Because the issue needing resolution, according to the above-cited language
""•") from Allen, is whether the work contribution is substantial, the Commission
/ finds the Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the medical evidence
that best addresses the question of how substantial the work contribution
was. Furthermore, just from a logical standpoint, where there are still 5
V, major risk factors present even in the absence of the work stress factor, it
"-*v) would seem adding one more factor is not a substantial contribution. The
* Commission also finds that Dr. Null's opinion is not completely at odds with
that of Dr. Perry. Dr. Perry merely elaborates more definitively in his
analysis. As such, the Commission finds* it was not mandatory that a medical
panel be appointed to resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy is
""/ evident.
The Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly
determined legal causation was not established as the work stress did not
contribute substantially to the risk of heart failure.
Because legal
causation is not established, there is no need to review the issue regarding
medical causation. Based on the failure to establish one of the necessary
elements of compensability, legal causation, the Commission finds the
Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits s'r»ruld be affirmed.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 10, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's June 22, 1987 Order is
hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only
pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-83.
,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on September /
1987, a copy of the attached
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT M. MCRAE was mailed to
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Robert McRae
209 East 100 North
Vernal, UT 84078
Keith E. Sohm
Attorney at Law
2057 Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
/
(/Elliott K. Morris
Attorney at' Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 45420
SLC, UT 84145-0420
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
-;

By

y^^^J^L^L^Lym//^
Pamela Hayes
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J. JOSEPH PERRY M.D, EA.C.C.
CARDIOLOGY

COTTONWOOD MEDICAL TOWER
5770 SOUTH 250 EAST, SUITE 340
MURRAY, UTAH 84107

September 18, 1986

Vickie Rhoads
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
560 S. 300 E.
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420
Dear Ms. Rhoads,
In response to your letter of September 11, 1986 regarding Robert McRae,
File #85-23000, I submit the following answers to your questions.
1. Is it probable that the stress of Mr. McRaeTs job caused or contributed to his myocardial infarction, June 28, 1985?
There was no change in his job requirements, the physical activity,
number or hours worked, or stresses in the months prior to his
myocardial infarction, compared to the years before this occurred.
Therefore, thei" is no causal relationship of an acute nature with
his myocardial infarction. The question of chronic job stress is
a different issue. I think that there was a much greater contribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from his
heavy cigerette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his
facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving personality
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney.
2. Was the need for bypass surgery caused by or accelerated by job
related stress?
No^.;\Again, as noted above there was no immediate or acute change in
his work requirements or performance.
3.

Hajs Mr. McRaeTs condition stablized?
Yed.
It has been stable for approximately six to nine months which
gave him three to six months to recover from his surgical proceedure.
Does Mr. McRae suffer any permanent partial impairment?
Yes. Mr. McRae has permanent impairment, but since I don't feel
it could be definately job related, 100% of that impairment is
related to pre-existing conditions.
Sincerely,

J. Joseph Perry, M
JJP:dmt
TELEPHONE (801)266-3418
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Cite as 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)

Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20026.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 14, 1986.
Worker, who sustained lower back injuries while stacking milk crates containing
four to six gallons of milk, sought review
of an order of the Industrial Commission,
denying his motion for review of an order
of an administrative law judge denying his
workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that- (1)
finding t>°t worker's injury was not "by
accident* was not based on ""le evidence
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's
claim would be remanded for further fact
finding as to whether action of worker,
who had previous back problems, in lifting
several piles of milk crates exceeded exertion which average person typically undertook in nonemployment life and whether
medically demcnstrable causal link existed
between worker's lifting and injury to his
back.
Vacated and remanded.
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart,
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent.
Stew«vt, Associate C.J., dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Evidence <£=>18
Supreme Court took judicial notice that
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid
water or approximately eight and one-third
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the
containers and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and crate.
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2. Workers' Compensation <s=>515
For purposes of workers' compensation, key requirement of an "accident" is
that occurrence be unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where either
cause of injury or result of exertion is
different from what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by
"accident"; clarifying Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Workers' Compensation <s==515
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof of unusual event may be helpful
in determining causal connection between
injury and employment; however, proof of
unusual event is not required as an elenv nt
of requirement that injury *>< "by accident." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation <s^515
An "accident," for purposes of requirement that injury be "by accident" to be
compensable under Workers' Compensation
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the
result of an injury; abandoning Redman
Warehousing
Corp.
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283;
Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-Day
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Uta^); Billings Computer Corp. v. Taran(,o, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953,
35^1-45.
5. Workers' Compensation <^568
Key question in workers' compensation
case in determining causation is whether,
given worker's body and worker's exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
6. Workers' Compensation e=>552, 568
Only those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required
by employment increases risk of injury
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which worker normally faces in his everyday life is compensable under Workers'
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally occur at work because preexisting
condition results in symptoms which appear
during work hours without any enhancement from the work place are not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=597
For purposes of workers' compensation, two-part causation test, requiring consideration of legal cause and medical cause
of injury, is required in determining whether causal connection exists between injury
and worker's employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah);
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roose^dahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah); Jones i
California
Packinb
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial
Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 OJtah); Residential and
Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah);
Powers v. Industrial
Commission,
19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
8. Workers' Compensation <$=*5o3
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury,
unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove "legal causation," for purposes of two-part causation test for determining whether causal connection exists
between claimant's injury and claimant's
employment; where there is no preexisting
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is
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sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-45.
9. Workers' Compensation <s=>597
For purposes of legal causation element of two-pait test for determining
whether causal connection exists between
claimant's injury and claimant's employment, precipitating exertion must be compared with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in
general, not nonemployment life of the particular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
10. Workers' Compensation <e=>597
Under medical causation portion of
two-part test for determining whether
causal connection exists between claimant's
injury and claimant's employment, claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation lod to resulting injury or Usability. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
11. Workers' Compensation <§=>1390
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness
of employee's exertions may be relevant to
medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant's employment. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
12. Workers' Compensation <s=>1533
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was not "by accident" as claimant was
stacking milk crates was not based on the
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant
had not complained of pain or limitations at
his job, and no evidence indicated that injury was predictable ^~ developed gradually
as with occupational disease or progressive
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
13. Workers' Compensation <e=>1950
Compensation claim of worker, who
had preexisting back problems and sustained lower back injuries while stacking
crates containing four to six gallons of
milk, was remanded for further fact finding on issue as to whether moving and
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ment of bed rest and medication. A myelogram finally revealed a herniated disc, and
the claimant spent ten days in traction in
the hospital in early January. He did not
return to work.

lifting several piles of crates weighing 30
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler
exceeded exertion average person typically
undertook in nonemployment Tife ara
whether there was medically demonstrable
causal link between worker's action in lifting milk crates and injur^T to his back and,
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose
out of or in the course of employment/'
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

The claimant also testified he had a history of prior back injuries, including a fall
from a telephone pole at age fourteen
which required him to wear a back brace
for several months, a back injury in 1977
while lifting sand bags for the Logan
School District, and another fall while
working for that employer when he slipped
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted
in prolonged absences from work.

Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Second Injury.
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund.
DURHAM, Justice:
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review
from the Industrial Commission's denial of
his motion for review of an administrative
law judge order denying him compensation
for a back injury sustained at work. For
the reasons stated '^elow, ;^e reverse an<J
remand.
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged 36, was employed as night manager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testified to the following version of events at a
hearing before an administrative law
judge. The claimant was working in a
confined cooler in the store stacking crates,
containing four to six gallons l of milk,
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While
lifting one crate to about chest level, he
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower
back. He immediately set down the crate
and asked another employee to continue
stocking the shelves. The claimant completed Sie one-half hour remaining in his
shift doing desk work. That night f he pain
increased, and by morning**his left leg felt
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr.
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during December were
followed through with the prescribed treat-

The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claimant. The employer's report of injury describes the accident as "picking up freight
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes
and stacking them from truck." No specific event was mentioned in the employer's
repo rf The medical records of treating
phys-aans described the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted any reference to a
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan,
who examined the claimant on December
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember
any distinct episode as having precipitated
his current problem, however." And in a
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history
was related as follows: "About six weeks
ago, however, he was lifting material at
work, and recalls no specific injury or
stress but developed discomfort in his left
groin area which ultimately extended into
his big toe."

1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs
about the same as liquid water or approximately
8V3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
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The administrative law judge found that
the claimant's injury to his back on November 23, 1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment." It is apparent that the administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" because there was no identifiable
tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh
approximately 50 pounds without the containers
and crate.
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event that caused the injury and because
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and
commonplace exertion expected of the job.
The administrative law judge analogized
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980), where a gradually developed back
injury was held to be not compensable
where the condition worsened without the
intervention of any external occurrence or
trauma.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting
back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his
job, was injured "by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers' Compensation Act,
U.C.A, 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That
Act, in pertinent part, provides:
Every employee . . . who is injured . . .
by accident arising out of or in the
course of his e ^oloyment .. shall h,e
paid compensation for loss sustained on
account cf .he injury....
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites
for a finding of a compensable injury.
First, the injury must be "by accident/'
Second, the language "arising out of or in
the course of employment" requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367. 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often failed to
distinguish the analysis of the accident
question from the discussion of causation
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the
Commission are faced with confusing and
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea2.

We note that man\ of our prior opinions so
intermingled the cair°tion and accident analyses that it is impossible to segregate them and
determine the basis for the Court's decision.
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the accident and causation elements in the following
language: "It appears to be mere coincidence
that defendant's injury . . . occurred at work.
Defendant bears the burden of showing otherwise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties
of employment to unexpected injury is simply
lacking. . . .
[T]he Commission's conclusion
that an accident occurred is without anv sub-

son we now undertake a fresh look at the
policy and historical background of the
workers' compensation statute in an attempt to provide a clear and workable rule
for future application by the Commission.
I.
The term "by accident" is not defined in
the workers' compensation statutes. The
most frequently referenced authority for
the definition of "by accident" is the case
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), v/here the
term was defined as follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events....
[T]his is" not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, st/ess or other repetitive cause, a
climax mieht be reached in such manner
as to propurly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as occupational
diseases....
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)).
Some confusion has developed as to whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual event. This issue frequently arises
when the employee suffers an internal failure 3 brought about by exertions in the
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted). See also Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963).
For an example of an opinion which does separate the accident and causation analysis, see
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
3.
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An "internal failure" refers to a category of
injuries that arise from general organ or structural failure brought about by an exertion in the
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our
cases have defined "by accident'' to include
internal failures resulting from both usual
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah 1980).
This Court first discussed the term "by
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278
(1922), where an accident was said to be
"something out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to time
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281.
This definition was used to distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were
covered under statutory provisions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where
the claimant suffers an internal failure the
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903]
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling
observed:
"Since the -\;se of Fenton v. Th'*iey,
nothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected.... It is enough
that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which on
a particular occasion is neither designed
nor expected. The test as to whether an
injury is unexpected, and so, if received
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident,'
is that the sufferer did not intend or
expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was
doing."
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in The Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.frav.
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Twtic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident.
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-
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After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal
failure cases on the ground that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v.
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the ground
that no overexertion occurred during the
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104.
That decision was apparently overruled,
however, when the Court embraced the
"unexpected result" rule and awarded compensation to an employee who suffered a
heart attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir.
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was followed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 92 I n J i 72, 66 P.2d 124
(1937), where :. unanimous Court he1 J that
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accident" since the result was "an unusual,
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place.
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of
benefits to a claimant who had suffered
from heart disease and experienced a heart
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary
duties. The Court pointed our, in dicta,
that the English common law would have
awarded compensation even if the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen
article, supra, the Court observed:
ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse'?,
1981 Utah L.Rev. 393.
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"[N]othing more is required than that • and the legislature by failing to amend has
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah
shall be unexpected
The element of at 15, 201 P.2d ai 968.
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'acThe
holding
o f PuHty
Biscuit
a]so
cident' is sufficiently supplied . . . if, s q u a r e i y ^ b r a c e d the concept that an orthough the act is usual and the condi- d i n a r y o r u s u a l e x e rtion that results in an
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore- u n e x p e c t e d injury is compensable. See 115
seen by him who suffers it."
U t a h a t lg_19j m
p
at %9_70
After
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237.
carefully considering the legislative purSix years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. pose of the workers' compensation statute,
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 prior precedent, and public policy, the
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly Court rejected the requirement that proof
adopted the English rule for the definition
of an unusual activity or exertion be a
of an accident and awarded benefits to a required element of the "by accident" deficlaimant who unexpectedly injured his back nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 967-70. The Court concluded that "there
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi- is nothing in the statute which would justity. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. fy a holding that an injury is compensable
After summarizing early Utah cases inter- where overexertion is shown but is not
preting "by accident" the Court concluded compensable where only ordinary exertion
that "since 1922 this .-ourt has uniformly
is shown, provided that in both cases it is
held that an unexpected internal failure
shown that Jic exertion causes the injumeets the requirements of ["by accident"] ry." 4 115 Utan at 19, 201 P.2d at 970.
4.

The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373,
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been
cited by this or any other court to support the
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v.
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204,
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave &
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) {Purity Biscuit cited
as stating majority position that usual exertion
causing an internal failure may be by accident);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964)
(relying upon causation rule of Purify Biscuit);
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 Sc.ld 308, 314
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from r 'pture of intervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964)
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered workmen's compensation case" that supported an
award where many factors led to the disability);
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208,
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave,
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a
compensable injury where the causal relationship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co.,
10 K.J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) {Pu-

rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State Indust.
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooper v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747,
750-51 (1950) {Purity Biscuit cited as an example of the divergent viewpoints for defining a
compensable accident).
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases.
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202;
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen
concluded without further discussion that "[t]he
Purity Biscuit decision ccrtainh needs a healthy
reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at
800. Two ye*»-s later in Redman
Warehousing
Corp. v. Indus., .at Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse."
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After
considering those cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit,
we now cannot agree that it was a "living
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah
1980).
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases
have held that an internal injury may be
compensable if it results from either a
usual or unusual exertion in the course of
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ^ulcer
caused by lifting an unusually heavy
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories V.
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and
unanticipated heart attack resulting from
exertion while inspecting roof structure);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from
shoveling coal compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617
P 2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting
from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 6YJ P.2d 69S {Utah W8ty
(back injury resulting from carrying steel
plates compensable despite prior history of
back disorders and ordinary activity);
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper-* 613
P2d 508 (Utah 1980) C x r t attack resulting from exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roosendakl Construction & Mining Corp.,
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver
suffered heart attack after repeatedly
climbing long steps); Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974)
(back injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial
Commission,
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart
distress occurring over a period of several
months compensable despite preexisting
condiuons); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965)
(back injury resulting from filing papers in
lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support
for applying the "unexpected result" rule
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases,
a separate line of opposing authority has
developed which requires overexertion or
an unusual event to prove an injury occurred "by accident/' Typically, these
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cases denied compensation because the
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there were no
events or exertions that were unusual or
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident."
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982)
(back injury from loading box of twelve
radios into van not compensable); Fabler's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant
with preexisting condition resulting from
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable since the activity was not unusual or
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury
suffered by janitor upon standing up not
compensable without evidence tnat activities wore unusual); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah
. ' 398, <S4 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury
precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not compensable without proof of
an unusual event). These cases will not be
collectively referred to as the Redman line
of cases.
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the
historical and logical definition of "by accident." The Redman line of cases relied on
the following abridged version of the definition of an accident found in Carling v.
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence, different /rom what would norraally be expected to occur in the usuu
course of events"
16 Utah at 261, 3C9
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted
phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident. This interpretation misconstrues the
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent
with the English definition of "by accident"
used by this Court since 1922. The key
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions,
was that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase emphasisd that where either the
cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore "by accident."
Policy considerations also militate in favor of rejecting the notion that the phrase
"by accident" requires an unusual event.
There is nothing in the term "accident"
that suggests that only that which is unusual is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40,
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring;
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does
not occur simply because a wrorker is injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson
in his treatise on workmen's compensation
with the following example
If an employee intentionally anu knowing! •' undertakes to lift a: .msual load,
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain,
a passerby observing him would not say
that he was undergoing an accident
merely because it is unusual to mow
lawns in the rain.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual
distinction as being unworkable in practice.
Realistically, it is impossible to determine
what are the usual and normal requirements of a job People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well
as light ones, and work for long hours as
well as short ^"es. None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id.
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168.
The unworkability of the usual-unusual
event requirement is further evidenced by
comparing seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court. Compare Kaiser
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back injury to miner with previous back problems

held to be a compensable accident despite
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual
course of employment), with
Fanner's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237
(no accident where worker with previous
back problems sustained back injury while
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable
accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) with Billings
Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104
(no accident where worker sustained knee
injury resulting from bending to pick up
small parts).
[3, 4] We believe that the Court's real
concern in the Redman line of cases was
the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of compensation.
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Sa 'nts, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed
in tue next section, the Court has developed
two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires an unusual event in order to meet the statutory
causation requirement. Although proof of
an unusual event may be helpful in determining causation, it is not required as an
element of "by accident" in section 35—145. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness."
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those cases which hold that
an accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the analysis <>\ "by accident" in
the Redman line of cases which predicates
the "accident" determination upon the occurrence of an unusual event.
II.
The second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's
employment duties. Pittsburg
Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation
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cases involving internal failures, the key
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is proved by the production
and interpretation of medical evidence either alone or together with other evidence.
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370;
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures
and because of the possibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed to
the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases.
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
This Court initially responded to the
problem of causation in internal failure
cases by suggesting that the Commission
use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See
Thomas D. Dee Men ^ rial Hospital Ass'n.
v Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61,
74, 138 P.2d 2o6, 238 (1943). The CICL/ and

convincing evidence standard was rejected,
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979),
with the rationale that such a standard
would make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the
deceased suffered from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the standard to prove
causal connection is preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
The second method that has been used to
ensure causal connection in internal failure
cases is to require proof that an unusual
event or activity precipitated the injury.
Presumably, this requirement was usr d to
prevent compensating a person predisposed
to internal failure where the preexisting
condition contributed' more to the injury
than his usual work activity. The following internal failure cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is
necessary to prove causation.
Billings
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is
still used where the employee suffers from a
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of
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Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104,
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Industrial
Commission,
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952);
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D.
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at
233; see Schviidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 23839 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798,
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30,
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting).
Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will open the fl^.dgates for payment
of benefits f?r all internal injuriec that
coincidentally occur at work. They ^aim
that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessary to prevent the employer from
becoming a general insurer. They argue
that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a
history or indication of physical disability
or handicap will be reduced.
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us
to follow a separate line of authority that
awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace
activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged
in a workplace activity and where there is
adequate evidence of medica1 causation.
See, e.g., Kaiser St^el Corp. o. Monfredi,
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's back
injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 N.W.2d 454, 458
(1982).
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties
upon proof of medical causal connection
between workplace exertions and the injury); Residential and Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission,
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in
the ordinary course of work compensable);
Powers v. Industrial
Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in the normal course of employment—the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary exertion);
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375/»•• 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of
cases. Moreover, Residential and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation
for usual workplace activity after the Mellen decision. Clearly, the usual exertion
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah
law.

recognized as long ago as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of
difficulties . . . may be opened by the refinements between « sual and unusual, exertion and overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by him or both." Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The contents of the Pandora's box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora
of our cases struggling with a definition of
a compensable accident based upon the
usualness or ordinariness of an activity.
Professor Larson has also criticized the
usual-unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the activity fails to consider
that some occupations routinely require a
usual exertion capable of causing mjury.
Likewise, other occuTalons, such as deskwork, require c/> little physical effor «] at
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient
to prove that the resulting accident arose
out of the employment. Larson, supra,
§ 38.81, at 7-270.6
[5] Because we find the present use of
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take
this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet
the objectives of the workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key
question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.,
concurring specially).

When read in chronological sequence,
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent
and confused approach to determining
when an accident arose out of or in the
course of employment. Much of this confusion can be traced to fundamental problems stemming from the use of the usualunusual distinction as a means of provin {
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270. The problems in determining
what activities were usual or unusual were

[6] The language Arising out of or in
the course of his employment" found in
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was
apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a
usually required by the job is so great that it
would break the strongest man even he will
not be able to recover. But if it is more than
usual exertion which causes the injury the
employee can recover no matter how light the
work is which causes the injury.
Id.

6. Larson's observation is consistent with this
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exertion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at
16, 201 P.2d at 968:
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever
know what this court will consider sufficient
overexertion. Also under that test if the work
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sufficient causal connection between the
disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentaily occur at ir jrk because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b)
those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which
the worker normally faces in his everyday
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.,
444* A.2d 32b, 337 (Me.1982). Only the
latter type of injury is compensable under
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. Tbere is no fixed
formula by which the causation issue may
be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case.
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a
two-part causation test which is coi sis tent
with the purpose of car workers' compensation laws ar.l helpful in determining causation. We therefore adopt that test. Larson suggests that compensable injuries can
best be identified by first considering the
legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the
test of 'arising out of the employment' . . .
[then] the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact
7.

caused this [injury]." 7 Larson,
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277.

supra,

[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an injury arose oirr of or in the course of employment is difficult to determine where the
employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting
condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
" Powers v. Industrial
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740,
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the
legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show
that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already face'* in everyday life because of
his condition. This additior^J element of
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the preexisting condition of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather
than exertions at work. Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:

Cases from other jurisdictions which have accepted the dual-causation standard suggested by
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980)
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied
compensation where injury could have been
triggered at any time during normal movement
and exertion at work ~"»t greater than typical
nonemployment exertio^;; Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982)
(claimant granted compensation where injury
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater
than that in everyday nonemployment life);
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me.
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition
awarded compensation for back injury resulting
from fall from his stool at work because of
increased risk of falling where employees
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant
with preexisting back condition denied compen-

sation for injury resulting from working at normal gait since there was no work-related enhancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d &Z4 (1982)
(policeman with history of heart di.« t ase awarded compensation for heart attach at home
where claimant's physician testified that attack
was caused b^ stress of police work rather than
personal risk lactors); Sellens v. Allen Prods.
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980)
(claimant with preexisting heart problems denied compensation for heart attack suffered
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck
trailer despite sedentary non working lifestyle
using objective standard of average worker in
nonemployment life); Couture v.
Mammoth
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting
btwf medically caused the fatal heart attack).
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If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution
must take thj form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness
or disease, any exertion connected with
the employment and causally connected
with the [injury] as a matter of medical
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test
of causation.
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation.
Where there is no preexisting condition, a
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8

v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497,
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed
' " Quoting from
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App.
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)).
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1980) (subjective test: "the employment must involve an exertion greater than
that normally performed by the employee
during his non-employment life"). Thus,
the precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life, not the
nonemployment life of the particular worker.

[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion
that the comparison between the usua} and
unusual exertion be defined according to an
objective standard. "Note that the comparison ••> not with this employee's usual
exertion in his employ w^J, but with the
ex^itions of normal noneiaployment life of
this or any other person." Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original).
See also Johns-Manville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 111.2d 171, 178, 35
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979)
(compensation denied where the risk of the
employment activity "is no greater than
that to which he would have been exposed
had he not been so employed"); Strickland

We believe an objective standard of comparison wm provide a more consistent and
predictable standard for the Commission
and this Court to follow. In evalurting
typical nonemployment activity, the focus
is r^ what typical nonemployment activ. ..s
are generally expected of people in today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. Typical activities
and exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the 20th century, for
example, include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height,
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By

8.

Larson highlights the difference between the
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we
today adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the heart attack area:
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of
200--pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift
medically produces a heart attack. Under the
old 'jnusual-exertion rule there would be no
c o n v e n s a u o n » regardless of pievious heart
conditio . Under the suggested .^le there
would be compensation, even in the presence
of a history of heart disease, because people
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a
part of nonemployment life, and therefore
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear and tear of life.
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job,
and suppose there is medical testimony that
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-

parison between this employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there
would be compensation. Under the suggested
rule the result would depend on whether
there was a personal causal element in the
form of a previou c iy weakened heart. If
there was not, comrrnsation would be awarded, since the employment contributed something and the employee's personal life nothing
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a
previously weakened heart], compensation
would be denied in spite of the medical causal
contribution, because legally the personal
causal contribution was substantial, while the
employment added nothing to the usual wear
and tear of life—which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders.
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote
omitted).
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using an objective standard, the case law
will eventually define a standard for typical
"nonemployment activity" in much the way
case law has developed the standard of
care for the reasonable man in tort law.
[10] 2. Mtdical Cause—The second
part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity. The purpose of the medical cause
test is to ensure that there is a medically
demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected
injuries that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.
With the issue being one primarily of
causation, the importance of the . . .
medical panel becomes manifest. It is
through the p'ipertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be able to
make r ae determination of vhether the
injury sustained by a claimant is causally
connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to
the resulting injury or disability. In the
event the claimant cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be
denied.9
III.
[11] We now undertake to ctpply the
foregoing analysis to the cas*- before us.
In reviewing findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's findings. Champion Home
9.

[12] We have previously stated that the
key element of whether an injury occurred
"by accident" is whether the injury was
unexpected. After reviewing the record,
we find no substantial evidence that the
injury was not unexpected. It is clear
from the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimant that he experienced an unexpected
and unanticipated injury to his back as he
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of
the cooler. Although the claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence
which indicates that this injury was predictable or that it developed gradually as with
an occupational disease or progressive back
disorder. While the employer's report of
injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurr^ in the coole/, the reports are
unhelpful in determining whether the injury v,"~ unexpected.
It appears that the administrative law
judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining an accident. We have
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on
unexpectedness. Moreover, the administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of whether an
accident occurred. We have previously
held that the aggravation or "lighting up"
of a preexisting condition by an internal
failure is a compensable accident. Powers
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude
therefore that the decision of the Commission that the claimant's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence,
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous.
[13] The key issue in this case, like
most internal failure cases, is whether the
injury "arose out of or in the course of

Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the
medical conclusion of causal connection.
Where the injury results from latent symptoms
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of
medical causation may be especially difficult.
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases

where compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate proof of medico 1 causation.
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(1), at 7-319 to -321.
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus Painters, Inc.,
418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) (heart attack triggered
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sedentary life of average worker compensable).
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employment." Since the claimant had previous back problems, to meet the legal causation requirement he must show that moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the
confined area of the cooler exceeded the
exertion that the average person typically
undertakes in nonemployment life. The evidence presented by the claimant was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causation. It is unclear from
the record how many crates were moved by
the claimant, the distance the crates were
moved, the precise weight of the crates,
and the size of the area in which the lifting
and moving took place. Because the claimant did not have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further factfinding on this issue.
Moreover, the record is insufficient to
show medical causation. It is unclear from
the medical reports whether the doctors
were aware of the specific incident in the
cooler. Further, the case was not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation.
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, we are unable to determine whether
there is a medically demonstrable causal
link between the lift in the cooler and the
injury to the claimant's back. We therefore remand to the Industrial Commission
for additional evidence and findings on the
question of medical causation.
The decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded.

whether the work incident aggravated a
preexisting condition sue], as would warrant an award of compensation.1 However,
I do not join the Court in adopting an
"unexpected resuV standard to be applied
in determining the existence of a compensable accident.
I do not believe that this Court has "misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident" in the bulk of its
recent cases concerning the issue at bar.
The majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co. \ Industrial Commission2
is
misplaced. The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simply ignored.3 The only case in which this
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission, 4 which support
is similarly without precedential value because it has also been ignored beginning
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler,'-' the very
next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission 6 and again
defined "accident" as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
be either the cause or the result of an
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
establish policy, has chosen wording which
precludes such an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Puri-

HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case tc the
Commission for the purpose of determining

son, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus
Christ of iMtter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n,
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm'n,
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).

1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143^44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967).
2.
3.

115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).
Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Fnto-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs,
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Ma-
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617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).

6.
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of
the majority's interpretation. The word
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may
be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as
an unexpected injury. The word "injury,"
on the other hand, denotes a result and not
a cause. Had the legislature only used the
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.,
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover
all results regardless of the cause. Had
the legislature only used the word "accident," then I would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended to cov^r both the cause and the
result. In fact, however, the legislature
has used both words "injury" and "accident." It follows that the word "accident"
must be interpreted as focusing upon the
cause and not the result. In short, the
majority's interpretation writes the word
"injury" out of the statute. Such ? decision is unwarranted in \iy view.
The legislature vecently amended se^ f, \n
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits the payment of compensation to those injured "by accident arising
out of or in the course of . . . employment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by
accident" standard has not been altered or
amended since its inception in 1917,9 The
legislature thus being satisfied with the
Court's interpretation of the term "accident" in the long line of cases beginning
with Carting v. Industrial
Commission™
I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that term.
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
I dissent. The majority defines the statutory term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardk"* of whether it is
produced by a usual or an unusual event.
The majority also defines the term "arising
out of or m the course of employment" to

impose legal and medical causation requirements. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon the physical condition of the
worker at the time he is injured. A worker
having no preexisting medical condition or
handicap need only prove that the accident
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." But for congenitally handicapped
persons and for persons who have suffered
preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some
physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning. Such a
worker may receive compensation only if
the "employment contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of
nonemployment life." According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove
that his internal breakdown was caused by
"an unusual or extraordinary
exertion"
in order to establish the requisite legal
causation, even though the majority opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-tm-.
usual Qiotinction as a means of proving
causation." How the majority can reject
that standard for persons having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that standard
for persons with preexisting conditions, is
baffling.
Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which
a worker with a preexisting condition must
demonstrate and the "usual exertion"
which a person with no preexisting condition must demonstrate is far from clear.
The latter standard is to be judged with
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person.' " The
Court emphasizes that the "precj jitating
exertion must be compared with the usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life
of the particular worker," What the term
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defined by the

7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah
Laws 610, 610.

9.

8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (RepI.Vol. 4B, 1974
ed., Supp.1986).

10.

62

Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917
Utah Laws 306, 322-23.
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).
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majority. The few examples set out do
little to explain the concept aimed at, other
than to suggest that the term means something more than simple, life-sustaining activities.
I when/ fail to understand why persons
who have a preexisting condition should be
placed in the disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless position, that the
majority opinion imposes upon them. The
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to
provide compensation for workers who
have preexisting medical conditions and
therefore run a greater risk of injury when
tluy expose themselves to the hazards of
the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than
encouraging them to abandon the work
force for some kind of unearned support.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with
pr^existin/ condition by spreading the
risk throughout the indust* \ to assure "<uch
peiv-uiis that their injuries will be carea for
without imposing extraordinary liabilities
on the employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v.
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504,
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to
favor those policies which encourage people to work, rather than policies that deter
employers from offering gainful employment to those who have a higher risk of
work-related injury. There is little personal or social benefit from a policy that tends
to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries or disabilities.
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the workmen's compensation laws to
impose higher standards for compensation
on those with preexisting medical conditions than on those without. Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a
negligence action is required to take the
victim as the defendant finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may
have are disregarded.
That principle
should not be, and until now has not been,

different in workmen's compensation law,
which is really a substitute for tort law
remedies. In short, handicapped or previously injured persons who are injured by
an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement.
I am also unable to understand how an
administrative law judge, the Industrial
Commission, or an appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's society," as they now must do for the purpose
of determining legal causation for workers
with preexisting medical conditions. Does
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does
during his or her nonemployment activities? Is it what a professional football
player does in his leisure time or what a
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary
worker does in his or her off-hours or what
a forest ranger does?
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated
principle. The examples "include taking
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings." These few examples,
which I find to be arguable in any event
since they reflect only what some people
may do from time to time, do not substitute
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder
whether changing a flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in today's society,
and I do not know how much luggage the
"typical" individual li ..s or how far he or
she carries it. The point is that the majority has not set forth a workable standard at
all. In fact, I have serious doubt that such
an artificial construct as "typical nonemployment activities" will produce more fair
and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical''
individual for the purpose of establishing a
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to "average"
people, and the law has always recognized
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as much. In short, I do not think that the
majority's newly established standard will
produce decisions one whit more consistent
or rational than those produced in the
past.1
The majority also holds that an injured
person must prove that the disability is
"medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I think
is unwarranted, the majority states that
"[t]he medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims/' I am fearful that that
hope is seriously misplaced.

Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Ricnard E. Holloway Trucking [Employer], and the
State Insurance fund [Insurance carrier for the Employer], Defendants.
No. 20621.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1986.
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R.
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.

Certainly Professor Larson, largely the
source of the Court's new standards and
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of
STEWART, Justice:
law, but there is much to be said for the
case-by-case approach in hammering out
Plaintiff Richard E Holloway is a selflegal doctrine, even if it does :>n occasion employed truck driver. On July 11, 1984,
produce inconsistencies, I readily concede after driving for about six hcurs he
that pre^jnt law needs to be rationalized stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he
* '1 that some cases sh • Id be overruled slipped while '"diking aerosF cJi J l '; , : ",u
because they are hopelessly inconsistent his way to the restroom and that the slip
with other cases, but I do not believe that caused him to jerk to regain his balance. Afthe law needs to be revolutionized in such a ter returning from the restroom, Holloway
manner as to defeat those humane policies bent over to inspect one of his truck tires.
intended to allow for the injuiies of work- While crouching, he experienced an immeers who come to the work place in an diate sharp pain in his back which made
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms
impaired condition.
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver,
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. drove for the rest of the trip. Two days
after the incident Holloway consulted a chiropractor in Georgia. He consulted another chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake
City. The slip on the oil spill was not
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors
who examined Holloway, in the First Report of Injury, or in the claimant's report
of how the injury occurred.
The Commission u aied review of the
administrative law judge's order. The
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was
not the result of an "accident" as that term
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring
exceptions and most of them piior to 1980.
That there are more inconsistencies the further
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is used under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
This case is controlled by Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986), which establishes new standards for
determining whether an "accident" occurred in internal breakdown cases, such as
the instant case. We therefore reverse and
remand to the Commission for reconsideration in light of Allen.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring):
I agree that this matter must be reconsidered by the Industrial Commission, since
the administrative law judge obviously considered recovery precluded by the "accident" standard set forth in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah
1982), and BAlings Computer Corp. v.
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983), cases
subsequent/ rejected by this Court's decision in Allen v. Industrie
Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). However, I
would add a few comments for the benefit
of the Commission on remand.
First, from the administrative law
judge's findings, it is clear that he considered the injury to be the unexpected
result of fatigue and strain incurred in the
course of employment. This is enough under Allen to support a finding that the
injury occurred "by accident/'
Second, the administrative law judge's
findings also suggest that he considered
medical causation to have been established,
i.e., there was a physiological causal linkage between the injury ^nd the job activities. Therefore, the OR 1 / remaining question appears to be whether legal causation
has been shown.

Third, with respect to legal causation,
the facts indicate that under Allen, Holloway wou 1 ! be entitled to recover unless he
brought to the job a preexisting condition
that contributed to his injuries. If he did
1 a /e such a preexisting injury, he would
have to show that the job-related injuries
were the product of "unusual or extraordinary exertion." Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 25-26. The record is silent as to whether Holloway had a preexisting condition.
With respect to the focus of this case on
remand—whether Holloway had a preexisting condition—I would observe that the
preexisting condition of which Allen
speaks need not be patent; in fact, it need
not have been known or knowable to anyone before the injury. The sole question is
whether the worker came to the workplace
with a condition that increased his risk of
injury. If he did rnd that condition contribute,! oO the injury, then Allen's higher standard of legal causa *'% comes into play ;c
as to place that worker on the same footing
as one who did not come to work with a
preexisting condition. See id., at 2526. To rule otherwise would create the
strong likelihood that a worker who has a
preexisting condition and whose virtually
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at
work will be able to foist the cost of that
injury on his employer when the workplace
had little to do with causing the injury.
HOWE, J., concurs in the concurring
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.
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step in deciding whether any defendant is
justified ^nder section 7G-2-405 is to determine what burden of proof the defendant
°nd the State are respectively required to
carry. It is impossible to allocate the burden of proof without first determining
whether the defendant is entitled to the
statutory presumption.
In view of the foregoing, we vacate the
trial court's finding of delinquency and remand this case for factual findings as to
whether the entry into R.J.Z.'s home was
unlawful and forcible, or otherwise qualifies under U.C.A., 1953, § 76-2-405(2) for a
legal presumption of reasonableness, and a
new determination regarding jurisdiction of
the juvenile court based on such findings.

JT^

Affirmed.
Stewart, Associate C.J., c o n c u r s , in
the result.

1. Workers' Compensation <§=»571
Heart attack was by "accident" for
workers' compensation purposes where
there was nothing in claimant's job duties
to suggest he would suffer a heart attack,
nor did he anticipate one, so that it was
"unexpected/' U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1536
Conclusion of Industrial Commission
that there was no medical causal connection between claimant's work conditio is,
during cold weather at high altitude, and
his heart attack, was neither i^uitrary or
capricious nor without substantial evidence
to support it, in light of conflicting medical
evidence and facts that claimant was working in a heated backhoe cab, using hydraulically operated controls. U.C.A.1953, 351-45.

HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate
C.J., and HOWE and ZIMMERMAN,
V, concur.

(O

capricious nor without substantial evidence
to support it.

,

\ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

James LANCASTER, Plaintiff,
v.
GILBERT DEVELOPMENT, State
Insurance Fund, and the Second
Injury Fund, Defendants.

Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Dennis Lloyd, Susan B. Diana, Salt Lake
City, for State Ins. Fund.

No. 20897.

Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Second Injury Fund.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 20, 1987.

DURHAM, Justice:
Workers' compensation benefits for
heart attack that occurred while claimant
was at work were denied by the Industrial
Commission, and claimant sought review.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that:
(1) heart attack was by "accident," but (2)
conclusion that there was no medical causal
connection between work conditions and
the heart attack was neither arbitrary or

The claimant, James Lancaster, seel N review of the denial of workers' compensation benefits by the State Industrial Commission for injuries from a heart attack
that occurred while he was clearing snow
with a backhoe at Brian Head Ski Resort.
We examine the evidence on this writ of
review to determine if the claimant's heart
attack is the result of an injury "by acci-

of section 78-3a-16). The findings we are requiring in this opinion are not jurisdictional
findings, but rather findings relating to the ap-

phcation of an affirmative defense to criminal
charges.
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dent arising out of or in the course of his
employment." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45
(Supp.1986). We recently established the
analytical framework for internal injury
cases such as this in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Using the dialysis in Alien, we affirm the
decision of the Industrial Commission.
On February 17, 1984, the claimant, aged
43, arrived for work at Brian Head Resort
at his usual hour of 7:00 a.m. The elevation at Brian Head Resort is approximately
ten thousand feet. Claimant's first task
was to clear snow using a backhoe. Although the temperature outside was cold,
the cab of the backhoe was heated. All of
the backhoe controls were hydraulically operated and required no unusual effort to
operate. During the morning's work, the
claimant climbed in and out of the backhoe
two or three times.
The claimant experienced chest pains,
which bee. * e more severe as the day progre n ccd. These pains weit more severe
than similar pains he had experienced four
days earlier. When the pains became debilitating, he informed his supervisor, who
then called paramedics; the claimant was
transported to a hospital in Cedar City,
Utah. The treating physician determined
that the claimant was suffering from acute
anterior myocardial infarction. After one
week at the hospital, the claimant was released to the care of his personal physician,
Dr. Chanderraj. Although this was the
claimant's first heart attack, he had several
preexisting risk factors that predisposed
him to heart attacks: a twenty-year smoking history, an elevated serum cholesterol
level, an elevated uric acid level, and borderline diabetes.
On Augx *» 10, 1984, the Industrial Commission held a hearing in which one doctor,
Dr. Perry, was appointed to a medical panel. A hearing on the medical panel findings was held on March 25, 1985. On April
5, 1985, the administrative law judge issued
his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order. The administrative law judge reviewed the conflicting medical evidence and
then adopted the medical findings of the

medical panel as his own. The administrative law judge found:
[T]he Applicant's work activities and the
myocardial infarction of [February 17,
1984] do not constitute an injury by accident. The Applicant's heart attack was
unexpected, but there was nothing about
his work activities that could constitute
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of
events. His heart attack appears to have
been a mere coincidence, and his work
activities did not contribute significantly
to its occurrence. At best, it is conjectural as to whether it even precipitated his
heart attack, but it clearly was not a
significant precipitating cause. There
was no evidence that the Applicant's
work activities on February 17, 1984
were particularly different from the activities he had been performing for many
weeks prior thereto.
The administrative law judgs ultimately d e \
nied the claim on the ground that the clair ant failed to show that the heart attack
was "by accident" and that the heart attack was medically caused by an exertion
in the workplace.
Our scope of review of factual findings
in Industrial Commission cases is limited.
We have explained in prior cases:
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary
and capricious" or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or
without "any substantial evidence" to
support them. Only then should the
Commission's findings be displaced.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v Monfredi, 631 P.2d
888, 890 (Utah 1981) {quoted in Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983), and Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 725
(Utah 1982)). At the time of his decision,
the administrative law judge did not have
the benefit of our analytical framework for
accident cases involving internal failures
set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Nevertheless, the record is sufficiently developed for
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us to apply Allen to the facts and conclusions in the case before us.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, we
explained that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, section 35-1-45, requires proof
that an injury occurred "by accident" and
proof of a causal connection between the
accident and the activities or exertions required in the workplace. 729 P.2d at 18.
The administrative law judge's ruling
shows that he found the evidence insufficient to meet both the accident and the
causation elements.
In Allen, we embraced the definition of
"by accident" first formulated in Purity
Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). We rejected
the position that an accident requires an
unusual event or occurrence. 729 P.2d at
20. An ordinary or usual exertion is sufficient to meet the "by accident" definition if
"the result of an exertion was different
from what would normally be expected to
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended a * therefore by accident." 729 P.2H i t 22. The critical factor
when determining whether an incident is
by accident is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at
22.
[1] Despite a finding that the heart attack was unexpected, the administrative
law judge concluded there was no accident
primarily because the claimant was undertaking his usual work duties. That conclusion cannot stand in light of the standard
set forth in Allen. Although the claimant
had experienced similar pains four days
earlier, he had not been advised of the
etiology of those pains and he had no forewarning that they would occur again on
February 17. Moreover, there is nothing in
the claimant's job duties to suggest that he
would suffer a heart attack. There is overwhelming evidence t*--»t the claimant did
not intend to have a heart attack, nor did
he anticipate one. These factors, taken
together with the finding that the myocardial infarction was the "unexpected" result
of an exertion in the workplace, require the
conclusion that the heart attack was "by
accident."
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The next step requires us to analyze the
causal connection between the heart attack
and the working conditions. See Hone v.
Shea, 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986). We
adopted Professor Larson's two-step causation analysis in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d at 25. In order to meet
the causation requirement, there must be
sufficient evidence of legal cause and medical cause. Under the legal cause test, "a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because
of his condition." 729 P.2d at 25. When a
claimant has no preexisting risk factors,
any exertion connected with the employment and causally connected with the injury as a matter of medical fact will satisfy
the legal causation test. 729 P.2d at 26.
In addition to proving legal causation,
the claimant must also prove medical causation. "Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show . . . that the stress,
strain or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or
disability." 729 P.2d at 27.
In this case, the administrative law judge
did not distinguish in his causation analysis
between legal and medical causation.
However, it is clear from the medical testimony and other evidence presented to the
administrative law judge that his decision
was based on the failure to prove medical
causation. Because the result in this case
turns on the issue of medical causation, we
will not examine the issue of legal causation.
[2] The claimant argues that his work
activities in cold weather and at a high
altitude precipitated the myocardial infarction. The medical evidence before the administrative law judge was less chan conclusive. The claimant's phyn:ian, Dr.
Chanderraj, was the doctor most certain
that the working conditions at Brian Head
contributed to the injury. His opinion,
however, was not unequivocal. He stated
that the altitude, cold, and working conditions "probably" precipitated the heart attack. Dr. Chanderraj answered questions
by the claimant's counsel as follows:

240

Utah

736 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, during all
of the time that Mr. Lancaster has been
your patient, have you had an opportunity to form an opinion as to whether or
not the elevation, the cold, and the working conditions at the time of Mr. Lancaster's myocardial infarction precipitated
that heart attack?
A. This is a very difficult question to
answer because it's a gray area in the
field of cardiology; the exact role of
precipitating factors in producing the
event, but it is well known that high
altitude, where the oxygen content of the
air is low, especially in cold weather, can
induce a myocardial event

uric acid elevation, his risk for coronary
artery disease is 8-10 times higher than
another male of his same age. From
informal jn gleaned from the records,
summary of testimony and talking to Mr.
Lancaster himself, I did not view his
y/ork as a risk factor for a myocardial
infarction. While it was apparently cold,
he was not involved in any unusual exertion, neither was he subjected to any
unusual stress.

Q. Would it be your opinion that the
cold, exposure, and the altitude, and the
work conditions played a significant role
or would be the trigger or the lighting up
process of the myocardial infarction?
A. I think we did go over this. I do
feel it triggered—let me put it another
way. If he had not been working up on
that particular day in the cold atmc
sphere, operating the heavy equipment,
in spite of having—in spite of five days
history of chest pain, he probably would
not have sustained a myocardial infarction.
Dr. Perry, the chairman of the medical
panel and a cardiologist, testified it was
"likely" that the conditions under which
Mr. Lancaster was working aggravated his
preexisting heart condition. However, Dr.
Perry also was less than certain about the
causal connection between the work conditions and the myocardial infarction. In his
report to the administrative law judge, Dr.
Perry identified and ranked the role of
various risk factors, incJdding those associated with work, in precipitating the claimant's myocardial infarction. He stated in
his report:
Mr. Lancaster has mild diabetes mellitus,
smokes cigarettes, has an elevated uric
acid and an elevated serum cholesterol
level, all of which increase risk of coronary artery disease. In very rough
terms the cigarette smoking, diabetes
and high cholesterol approximately each
double the risk of coronary artery disease such that with these three plus the
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. . . While it is possible the cold exposure and his exertion had a role in precipitating the myocardial infarction, it is my
opinion that is is unlikely they played a
significant role. His 5 days of unstable
angina lead me to believe that the patient
was about to have a myocardial infarction, and the rather moderate amount of
exertion and the length of time spent
working simply offered an appropriate
time and place for this event.
Y\U»en asked to quantify the contribution
of preexisting ris^ factors and work
factors to the claim^u s myocardial infarction, Dr. Perry assigned a value of 90 percent to preexisting conditions and 10 percent to work conditions. Dr. Perry explained, however, that his assessment of
the factors was "a fairly random guess."
In addition, the State Insurance Fund
had its doctor, Frank Dituri, review the
claimant's medical records. Dr. Dituri
opined that there was no evidence to indicate that the claimant's myocardial infarction was caused by his work or the altitude
and cold at his place of work. Dr. Dituri
concluded, "The type of work activities described could not precipitate any acute
myocardial infarction." According to Dr.
Dituri, the claimant's injury was "due to
the normal progression of arteriosclerotic
cororary artery disease that had been
presciit for several years and was due to
such factors as his smoking, his hypercholesterolemia, his poorly controlled diabetes
and his prior history of alcohol abuse."
Thus, although there may have been
some connection between the heart attack
and the cold weather and high altitude, the
evidence of any such connection is inconclusive. Not one of the doctors was willing to
state with medical certainty that the claim-
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ant's injury was caused by work-related
factors. Thus, there is competent and comprehensive medical evidence in the record
upon which the administrative law judge
could rely in concluding that medical causation was lacking. Although the medical
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to
resolve factual conflicts.
We hold that the Industrial Commission's
conclusion that there was no medical causal
connection between work conditions and
the claimant's heart attack is neither "arbitrary or capricious" nor "without any substantial evidence to support it." We therefore affirm the order of the Industrial
Commission.

statutory authority or rule which properly
conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court,
as well as other information, will result in
dismissal of appeal, particularly when counsel ignores appellate court's request that
statement be properly amended. Rules
App.Proc, Rule 9(e).
2. Appeal and Error <S=>784
Appeal required dismissal where counsel filed docketing statement which failed
to comply with requirement that statement
set forth any statutory authority or rule
which properly conferred jurisdiction upon
appellate court. Rules App.Proc, Rules 9,
9(d).

HALL, C.J., and HOWE and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

LaMar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in
the result.

Linda Wheat Field, Attorney, Dept. of
Employment Sec, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
DAVIDSON,
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Craig BROOKS, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Defendants.
No. 860284-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 24, 1987.
After completion of litigation, counsel
for plaintiff prutioned for writ of review.
The Court of appeals held that appeal required dismissal based upon counsel's filing
of docketing statement which did not conply with rule requiring statements to set
forth statutory authority or rule which
properly conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court.
Dismissed.

PER CURIAM:
[1,2] In the above case, plaintiffs counsel filed with this Court a "docketing statement" that does not comply with Rule 9 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
The statement filed fails to set forth any
statutory authority or rule which properly
confers jurisdiction upon this Court. Other
information required by Rule 9 is also lacking and necessary documents are not attached. R. Utah CtApp. 9(d).
Docketing statements must fully comply
with Rule 9. Failure to comply will result
in dismissal of the appeal, particularly
when counsel ignores our request that the
statement be properly amended. Gregory
v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 735 P.2d
33 (Utah 1987); R. Utah Ct.App. 9(e).
The appeal is dismissed.
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